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Few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts as
that posed by the Constitution's requirement that private property
not be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.'
Despite the intensive efforts of commentators and judges,2 our ability
to distinguish satisfactorily between "takings" in the constitutional
sense, for which compensation is compelled, and exercises of the police
power, for which compensation is not compelled, has advanced only
slightly since the Supreme Court began to struggle with the problem
some eighty years ago. 3
Contemporary interest in environmental quality has spawned vari-
ous attempts at property regulation, many of which actually or poten-
tially collide with the takings provision.4 Nearly every attempt to regu-
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. U.S. Consr. amend. V: "IN]or shall private property be taken for public Use, with-
out just compensation." This requirement has been deemed incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235.41 (1897);
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266. 279(1943). It is this language of
the Fifth Amendment that is referred to throughout the article as the "takings provision"
or the "compensation provision" of the Constitution.
2. Ambitious recent articles include Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Per.
spective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. C. Pm. 63 (1962;
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rxv. 1165 (1967). See also Sax, Taldrgs and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
3. Justice Harlan's opinion in Mugler v. Kansas. 123 U.S. 623 (1887), is generally
treated as the beginning of modem compensation law.
4. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals. 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Maine v.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Maine 1970); Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State
Policies Against Marine Pollution-The Maine Example, 23 MAINE L. Rn'. 143 (1971);
Waite. Ransoming the Maine Environment, 23 MAINE L. REv. 103 (1971); Bartlett v.
Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971). See also Zabel %. Pinellas Co.
IV. & NA., 171 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1965). A leading case, upon which the wetlands decisions
rely heavily, is Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770
(1964) (flood plain regulation). See also Arveme Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher. 278 N.Y.
222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1938) and Morris County Land Improvement Co. %. Ton-
ship of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 556-57, 193 A.2d 232, 241 (1963). Compare
Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco B.C. & D. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557,
89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
Principal bills now pending in the Congress which would ban strip mining are H.R.
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late the private use of land, water, and air resources may be claimed
to violate the takings clause. This conflict, along with other aspects of
the campaign for environmental quality, suggests the need for a re-
consideration of the notion of property rights. The abandon with
which private resource users have been permitted to degrade our nat-
ural resources may be attributable in large measure to our limited
conception of property rights. Not surprisingly, an amended notion
of property rights suggests a reformulation of the law of takings. Per-
haps more importantly, a new view of property rights suggests that
current takings law stands as an obstacle to rational resource allocation.
This article will contrast the traditional view of property rights,
which focuses solely on activities occurring within the physical bound-
aries of the user's property, with a view founded on a recognition of
the interconnectedness between various uses of seemingly unrelated
pieces of property. Once property is seen as an interdependent network
of competing uses, rather than as a number of independent and isolated
entities, property rights and the law of takings are open for modifica-
tion. This modification will include a change in the position I took
in an earlier article,5 where I suggested that government activities
with respect to private property could be divided into two categories.
When the government acted as a participant in the competition for
use of various resources it was to be seen as an enterprise, and when
it functioned to settle conflicts between private claimants it was to
be seen as a mediator. The basis for distinguishing between takings
(compensation compelled) and exercises of the police power (com-
pensation not compelled) was the nature of the government activity.
Where private parties incur economic loss as a result of government
6484, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Rep. Ken Hechler of West Virginia and
S. 1498, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), introduced by Senators Gaylord Nelson and George
McGovern. A far-reaching state bill has been passed in West Virginia; 1 BNA ENV. REv'.
CURRENT DEv. 1366 (1971).
See generally Bosselman, The Control of Surface Mining: An Exercise in Creative Fed-
eralism, 9 NAT. Ras. J. 137, 155 (1969); Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 KY. L.J.
652 (1971); Note, Reclamation of Strip Mine Spoils, 50 Ky. L.J. 524, 538 (1962); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Governmental Regulation of Surface Mining Activities, 46 N.C.L.
REv. 103 (1967). Hearings on Surface Mining Reclamation Before the Senate Committee
on Interior & Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
5. See Sax, supra note 2. The following pages should make clear the respects in which
my present thoughts depart from those expressed in my earlier article. In general, I am
still persuaded that neither the traditional diminution-of-value theory nor the noxious
use theory is acceptable. Also unchanged is my view that neither history nor reason
require us to protect a property owner against total economic loss when the regulatory
authority of government is exercised for a legitimate purpose. I am compelled, however,
to disown the view that whenever government can be said to be acquiring resources
for its own account, compensation must be paid. I now view the problem as consid-
erably more complex. The pages that follow are an extended commentary on why and
how my views have changed on this point.
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enterprise activity, it was argued that the activity be classified as a tak-
ing. Where losses are incurred as a result of competition among vari-
ous nongovernmental property owners, the government having acted
as a mediator between those claims, it was argued that the losses should
not be compensable as a constitutional right.
The modification which follows from a new notion of property
rights is substantial. Much of what was formerly deemed a taking is
better seen as an exercise of the police power in vindication of what
shall be called "public rights." Having explored the concept of "public
rights" and having delineated a new view of takings, this article will
briefly explore the consequences of a new notion of property rights
for the broader questions of resource regulation and allocation of the
costs of conflict between would-be resource users.
I. Takings Law and Property Rights
According to the dominant doctrinal model of takings law,0 the
diminution of value theory, the criterion for recognizing a particular
economic injury which follows from government action as a taking
is the extent of economic loss. A court asks whether, and to what
extent, the owner's ability to profit from the piece of property in ques-
tion, considered by itself, has been impaired. If the profit-making
capacity has been very severely reduced, the government is said to have
"'taken" and the owner is constitutionally entitled to compensation.7
6. The other three principal approaches are: (1) the invasion theory, that makes
compensation depend on whether the government has formally taken sion and
title, (2) the noxious use test, which defines certain activities as socially undesirable,
and therefore as non-property, and (3) the cause of the harm test, which assumes that in
the case of conflicting activities between neighboring owners, one activity can be identi-
fied as causing harm to the other. These theories are discussed in Sax, supra note 2.
at 46-50.
7. The wetlands cases, cited in note 4 supra, exemplify this approach. To be sure,
one finds the seeds of contextual analysis in the cases occasionall$, as in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926). or in justice Holmes' famous
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 893 (1922). Holmes notes, for eC-
ample, that "some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must )yield to
the police power." Id. at 413. He also indicates that in some circumstances there might
be found "a public interest sufficient to warrant . . . a destruction . . ." of the owner's
opportunity to profit from his property. Id. at 414. Holmes' observations are, however,
only suggestive and tantalizingly vague. He never explored the question of context Sys-
tematically nor did he treat it as more than an inevitable practical exception to the
obvious rule that for government to make it "commercially impracticable" to profit
from one's property is, constitutionally, to take it. See note 18 infra. Subsequent judicial
authority has focused on the rule and rarely explores the implications of the "exception"
Holmes observed. Courts do some balancing of interests to avoid the extreme implications
of the dominant rule, but there is a hierarchy in which the right to profit stands first,
with a grudging exception for exigent public need. The pages that follow are a challenge
to this way of looking at the problem.
The Yale Law Journal
Notice that this takings doctrine is tied to an assumption that the
right to compensation, and the amount to be paid, can be determined
by examining the economic effects that occur solely within the physi-
cal boundaries of one's property.8 Surely it is naive, however, to sup-
pose that one who profits from a piece of property necessarily uses only
those resources within his boundaries, and equally naive to think the
consequences of one property user's activities are confined to his
property. Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are
tied to one another in complex ways, and property is more accurately
described as being inextricably part of a network of relationships that
is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property boundaries
with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing. Frequently, use of
any given parcel of property is at the same time effectively a use of, or
a demand upon, property beyond the border of the user.0
The inadequacy of the view of property rights embodied in takings
law can be demonstrated by reference to governmental regulation of
strip mining. Assume that the government has prohibited all strip
mining on land having a slope of more than twenty degrees, because
it has been determined that, given present technology, mining on
such lands exposes lower lying land, owned by others, to ruinous
erosion. Under present practice, the question posed by a court would
be whether the governmental regulation, however justified, so reduced
the value of the restricted owner's land as to deprive it of all present
economic productivity.10 If the effect of prohibiting strip mining were
to make the mining land utterly worthless to the holder, who might
own only coal mining rights, most courts today would award compensa-
tion to him. From the limited perspective of the mineral owner claim-
ant, who asks that the general public bear the cost of thus advancing
the social welfare, such a result might seem appropriate.
It is more accurate, however, to identify the problem in quite another
8. The present takings standard is deficient in other ways as well. It is internally
inconsistent, for while the criterion of total economic loss is the touchstone in current
compensation law, many instances of total loss are in fact left uncompensated by re-
defining those interests as non-property. Sax, supra note 2, at 50-60. Thus, lotteries, the
manufacture of liquor, and debt adjustment are prohibited without compensation since
these uses are said not to constitute property. Similarly, heavy losses resulting from
government regulation of industry may be described as the prevention of waste or the
elimination of a nuisance, in neither of which anyone holds a property interest. Id. at 52.
The present system is also inconsistent in its determination of when a "total loss"
has occurred. Id. at 60. Compensation may be required for the total loss of one tract
held separately by an individual who owns twenty other nearby tracts, but not for a
five per cent loss to the same tract held as a single property.
9. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1960); Michelman,
supra note 2, at 1167.
10. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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way. The mineral owner demands that the lower land serve to carry
mining wastes while the lower owner demands that the upper lands
be preserved in such a way as to protect his desired uses. Neither
owner is merely using his own property, nor is either entitled a priori
to have his demand met, for neither of the conflicting uses is, in some
theoretical sense, superior to the other. Traditional legal analysis has
looked only to the effects of government action on the complainant's
land, and has thus attended to only one fraction of the problem, for
the property interest in controversy is not simply the land circum-
scribed within the boundaries of the mine owner's tract, but the
totality of property the mine owner is using, which includes the land
owned by those lower down.1' Is there any reason in theory why the
lower owner ought not to be equally entitled to recover from the
government for failing to protect his property right to use his land
for residential purposes by prohibiting mining above him? Surely
there is no theory of property rights that suggests that property owners
should have an advantage in conflict resolution merely because of
superior physical position, e.g., being located at the top of a hill.
Under present theories of takings, if it is recognized that both the
miner and the lower landowner are equally property owners, each
using both his own tract and the tract of his neighbor, an anomaly
results. To prohibit strip mining would be a taking of the miner's
property, while a failure to prohibit the mining would be a taking of
the lower owner's land.12 Requiring the public to pay for the costs
generated by every situation of conflicting uses between property own-
ers would wildly expand the reach of the compensation provision of
the Constitution, which is addressed to situations in which the govern-
ment takes away from a property owner some extant right.13 Tradi-
11. Notably, the law's perspective is not usually so limited when such problems arise
as private nuisance cases. There, both competing interests are examined and balanced.
W PROssER, TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1971). But see note 7 supra. As the subsequent pages
will suggest in more detail, the broader perspective (in this respect) of nuisance law can
be instructive in seeking to understand the constitutional compensation problem.
12. In theory, the mere passivity of government in the latter case ought to make no
difference. The problem can arise in a practical fashion, as where the lower owner
sues the miner for an injunction in a nuisance action and asserts a constitutional right
to prevail, or claims that the government's refusal to regulate the miner is itself a
taking. Such claims have been made on behalf of lower riparians on a stream when
there has been an alleged failure to constrain upstream polluters. New Hampshire v. AEC,
406 F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969); Board of Public Works V.
Larmer Corp., 262 Md. 24, 277 A.2d 427 (1971); Connecticut Action Now v. Roberts
Plating Co., 2 BNA ENv. REP. CAsEs 1731, 1733 (1971).
13. Plainly the history of the compensation provision cannot be read to require com-
pensation whenever there is a loss incurred by a conflict in uses. "What seemed to
concern the early writers was not the fact of loss but the imposition of loss by unjust
means." Sax, supra note 2. at 57.
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tional compensation law has dealt with this anomaly by limiting its
attention to one party, unrealistically assuming that the government's
action affects only the property owner who loses because of the regu-
lation imposed.
A more accurate picture of property use is suggested by an example
in which a number of owners each claims a right of use in a common
resource such as a lake or a common grazing field. The rights of each
user can only be defined with reference to the claims of other users,
and there may be incompatibilities not subject to solution by simply
parcelling out the resource in equal shares.
14
To be sure, the effects of an activity like strip mining ordinarily
range far more broadly than the simple upland-lowland example
would imply. Not only is there likely to be erosion affecting neighbor-
ing tracts, but the exposure of stripped land may contaminate nearby
water bodies, impairing uses of a quite diffuse class of interests spread
far beyond the immediate area. The strip miner, in short, is likely to
be a user of a tremendous range of natural resources extending dozens
or even hundreds of miles distant from his own tract.15
This phenomenon of inextricable relationships among property
uses appears quite frequently. In the cases of the smoke-emitting fac-
tory located next to residential property, the noise-making airport
located near private homes, the water-polluting factory located up-
stream from users requiring clean water, and other instances where
spillover or third party effects are generated by a particular property
use, we find that conflicting demands are being made on a common
resource base. It is important to note that the demands arise from
both sides-the homeowner demanding quiet imposes on the noise-
making airport just as much as the airport users' demand to conduct
noise-producing activity impinges on the homeowner.
It hardly seems appropriate, when the government intercedes to
settle the conflict, to find that a "taking" has occurred simply because
14. Commercial fishermen may not be able to make a living unless they are per-
mitted sufficient uses that the lake is destroyed for sports fishermen. Surely the commer-
cial fishermen cannot assert a constitutional right to stay in business as against the
sportsmen, or vice versa. The problem can be resolved only by considering the claims
of both classes of users simultaneously. This analogy does not require one to assume
that a fisherman's right in a lake is historically the same kind of interest as fee simple
ownership of a tract of land. It assumes only that each class of user has an interest In
the lake equal at the outset to that of his competitors. As to the posture of each vis-a-vis
the other, the conflict between sport and commercial fishermen is identical to that
between the miner and the lower landowner.
15. If this seems a dramatic way of describing the facts, one need only consider the
sensational data revealed by students of pesticides, who find DDT in the remotest
regions of the earth. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, at 71, col. 6.
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the uses one owner was formerly able to make within his boundaries
have been curtailed. The restriction may instead represent a resolution
of conflicting demands so as to protect and maintain the uses of other
parcels of property within their boundaries. The point is that the
ecological facts of life demonstrate a powerful inextricability in the
utilization of natural resources. If we wish to cope intelligently with
the use of resources, we must focus attention on the nature and degree
to which the consequences of any use are disseminated across property,
state, and even national boundaries. The law relating to property
rights and takings of property ought to begin to reflect this knowledge.
II. Public Rights and a New Law of Takings
It remains to determine the consequences for the law of takings of
recognizing the interconnectedness of property uses. It was noted
above that in many circumstances a particular private property use
generates far-reaching effects for other property users. When these
effects fall on discrete property-users in substantial degree, the law
has responded to the conflict somewhat by recognizing private rights
of action such as nuisance. One characteristic of external effects as
they have been illustrated above, however, is that they often fall quite
broadly, affecting a large number of potential claimants, each in rela-
tively small amounts. While these effects might be cognizable if they
reached one or a few property owners, the effects of strip mining may,
for example, be too broadly felt for any particular litigant to come
forward. An important question is whether these costs should be
allowed to remain where they fall, or whether instead the interests
which are diffusely held should be recognized and advanced in the
form of "public rights."
At present the idea that public rights can prevail over private
property rights appears in the law only sporadically, as in navigation
servitude, public nuisance and the public trust doctrines.10 Perhaps
16. To be sure, certain public rights, such as the navigation servitude, have been long
and openly recognized. United States v. Chandler Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913).
Public nuisance and zoning laws, too, incorporate some conception of public rights. See
note 7 supra; W. PROSSER, supra note I1, § 88. But the idea is certainly a limited and
underdeveloped one in our legal system, as compared with the concept strength of
private property rights. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The
Public Trust Doctrine]; Wilkes, supra note 4, at 153-54. In referrint to public rights,
I mean something much broader than mere title-holding by a public body. See Note,
The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public Property, 67
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the closest the courts have come to an explicit recognition of public
rights of the kind and magnitude suggested here is a statement by
Justice Holmes in Erie R.R. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners.
Though Holmes may be criticized for resolving the conflict between
private and public tights without sufficient evaluation, his recognition
that there exist public rights which may prevail over private interests
is notable:
Grade crossings call for a necessary adjustment of two conflicting
interests--that of the public using the streets and that of the
railroads and the public using them. Generically the streets rep-
resent the more important interest of the two .... Being places
to which the public is invited and that it necessarily frequents,
the State ... has a constitutional right to insist that they shall not
be made dangerous to the public, whatever may be the cost to
the parties introducing the danger... It is said that if the same
requirement were made for the other grade crossings of the road
[the railroad] would soon be bankrupt. That the states might be
so foolish as to kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them, has no
bearing on their constitutional rights. If it reasonably can be said
that safety requires the change it is for them to say whether they
will insist upon it, and neither prospective bankruptcy nor en-
gagement in interstate commerce can take away this fundamental
right of the sovereign of the soil.1 7
The notion that public rights may be vindicated without compul-
sory compensation, however, has not been widely held. Far more
prevalent is the conventional view that any governmental regulation
that makes a private right essentially worthless is a taking of property
for which compensation must be paid.' 8 With the exception of the
CoLum. L. REv. 1683 (1967); Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75
YALE L.J. 1053 (1966).
In general, we do not conceive of the public as a property owner competing with
private owners for an accommodation of equal, conflicting claims. The wetlands cases,
cited note 4 supra, illustrate the general attitude.
One finds an insensitivity to diffuse claims, or public rights, even in articles as thought.
ful as Professor Michelman's, supra note 2, at 1181, 1203, 1219-20, 1244. What Is the
"distribution" as to which "permanence," id. at 1203, is considered desirable, or what are
the "outstanding expectations," id. at 1244, in the wetlands cases? I think Professor
Michelman and I join issue on the question of how my conception of diffuse claims of
right-as equal in status to conventional private property-are to be treated under the
theory set out in his article, see id. at 1236-44.
17. 254 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1921). Except for the notion that the railroad "introduced"
the danger, Holmes' statement is quite consistent with the theory advanced in this article.
18. See cases cited in note 4 supra. It is not easy to square what Holmes said in the
Erie R.R. case with what he said in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Though perhaps he simply found the conflicting claim insufficiently important to prevail
in the latter case, the opinion hardly makes this clear, and that decision seems prop'
erly remembered for its emphasis on the idea that the right to profit is inherent in
the very existence of a property right.
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navigation servitude doctrine,10 public rights are usually recognized
only insofar as it is "economically feasible" for private owners who
come into conflict with them to conform. This, for example, has been
the general experience with the public right to clean air and water.20
An example is provided by the situation in which one owns low
lying land which serves, in its natural state, as a flood control reservoir.
Under conventional property law, the owner would have a property
right to drain, fill and develop this land even if that activity created
serious flood control problems for a large number of persons below
him. If the public wishes to retain his land as a natural reservoir, that
right must be purchased from him, for it is not thought that there is any
public right in protection against flooding.2 1 Under the view proposed
here, the lower owners cumulatively should be treated no differently
than the individual lower owner, though they speak as members of
the diffuse public rather than as conventional property owners.2 2 If two
19. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. California, 67 Cal.2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967).
20. The situation is not completely clear. Factories are occasionally closed down, but
in circumstances where the owner probably could have complied with the restriction
and still stayed in business. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469
(4th Cir. 1970); City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 240 So.2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Maryland v. Galaxy Chemical, 2 BNA E~v. Rn'. CAsEs 1199, No. 1921-13
(Cecil County Cir. Ct. Jan. 26, 1971); City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp.,
248 La. 363, 175 So.2d 251 (La. Ct. App.), writ of review refused, 248 La. 363, 178
So.2d 655 (1965), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 905 (1966). Air and water pollution laws are
almost always administered as if they incorporated a requirement of economic feasi-
bility. The language of statutes varies widely, but some such provision is usually in-
cluded. Compare Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(h) (1970)
("economic feasibility"); Federal Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-6(a)(1)
(1970) ("best system of emissions reduction which [taking into account the cost of achiev-
ing such reduction] . . . has been adequately demonstrated.'); 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-7(c)(2)
(1970) ("technology . . . available" for control of hazardous air pollutants). Mich. Air
Pollution Act, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 336.31 (1967) ('. . . shall grant a variance ...
[if] compliance would constitute an undue hardship and would be out of proportion
to the benefits to be obtained thereby." However, "[a] variance shall not be granted
• where the person . . . is causing air pollution which is injurious to the public
health.')
The common law analogy is illustrated by Folmar v. Elliot Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa.
592, 596, 272 A.2d 910, 912-13 (1971): "An actor's conduct is unreasonable . . . unless
the utility of his conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm .... [Tihe actors conduct
lacks utility if it is economically and technically possible to correct the harm and such
steps are not taken." But see Mitchell v. Hines, 805 Mich. 296, 302, 9 N.W.2d 547, 550
(1943); W. PRossER, supra note 11, at 583-86.
21. E.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 30, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
22. The change of view between this and my former article. Sax, supra note 2, is
illustrated by Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
Owners of undeveloped land, valuable as a wildlife sanctuary and as a water retention
area, controlling drainage in the neighborhood, desired to develop their land for in-
dustrial use. Zoning laws were passed that required the land to be retained in its
original condition, and the owners sought compensation on the ground that their land
had been taken. I previously took the view that compensation ought to be paid. asserting
that the restriction was in effect an acquisition by the township of an addition to its
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property owners have adjoining tracts, one of which has traditionally
absorbed drainage water, the upper owner is not necessarily entitled
to drain that water to the lower land. Analogously, one should be
prepared to recognize a public interest in flood control equal in stature
to the private property owner's interests. In this way, the conflict can
be resolved so as to maximize net benefits from the resource network
in question, and either claimant might constitutionally be required
to yield without receiving compensation.
The same argument can be made on behalf of less conventional
interests. Thus, prohibition of the owner of forested lands from cut-
ting his trees for commercial lumbering or from cutting them except
under certain restraints could be asserted as a public right, equal in
competitive stature to the landowner's interest in marketing his trees.
In 1949 the Supreme Court of Washington vindicated just such a
right by upholding a statute requiring those engaged in commercial
logging operations to leave a certain number of trees standing for
reseeding and restocking purposes.2 3 "Cut and run" lumbering prac-
tices, the court noted, denuded hillsides, thereby increasing the dan-
gers from floods and contributing to costly soil erosion, 24 in addition
to endangering the economic standing of the state by destroying forest
lands that could serve as a permanent source of employment for the
state's citizens.
Noting that the state can "use reasonable means to safeguard the
economic structure upon which the good of all depends," 2rG the court
park and water supply system, indistinguishable from a situation in which the town-
ship had purchased title to the land. I now see the error of that analysis.
The case was one of conflict between the land company and a rather diverse group
of users and owners dependent upon the land sought to be developed. The conflict is
identical to that discussed here in respect to the strip miner and the lower landowner.
Each class of users is making demands upon the other as to use of the other party's land
for the protection or development of his own. The land company in the Parsippany-Troy
Hills case ought to have no more right, as such, to fill and develop its marshy land
than any private landowner has to collect the water draining over his land in a diffuse
fashion, and to dump it in concentrated form on the owner below. The regulation
should not be viewed as a governmental acquisition. To be sure, the public benefits
from the restriction imposed, but the beneficiary class threatened by the proposed de.
velopment need not be viewed as "taking" something they did not previously have by
right. Rather, whether the competing owners are a small concentrated group of landowners
or a diffuse public, they too should be viewed as having rights entitled to compete
equally in a benefit analysis of the resource network at issue.
This is not to say that one should have an absolute right against upper drainage
though that may be the law in some places. Rather there should be subjection of both
parties to a neutral benefit analysis. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.2d 396, 412 P.2d 529,
50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
23. State v. Dexter, 32 Wash.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949), a! 'd per curiam, 338 U.S.
863 (1949). Compare Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405 (1965) (restriction of
hunting on private land).
24. 32 Wash.2d at 555-56, 202 P.2d at 908 (1949).
25. Id. at 556-57, 202 P.2d 908 (1949). By adding "and biological" to the last passage
quoted, the decision could serve perfectly as a statement of environmental principle today.
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held that these public interests were entitled to be weighed against
the landowner's interest. The concept of public rights set out in the
Washington case was not limited to some defined physical entity, but
included more widespread interests in flooding, erosion, and the
maintenance of those resources found necessary to sustain the well-
being of the community. No less a public right might be asserted in
the maintenance of a scenic amenity, or in the preservation of histori-
cally and scientifically valuable areas.
20
The view proposed here would recognize diffusely-held claims as
public rights, entitled to equal consideration in legislative or judicial
resolution of conflicting claims to the common resource base, without
regard to the manner in which they are held. Thus, if the strip miner
can be required to yield to a single lower landowner without compen-
sation under a relative benefit analysis--as in the model of private
nuisance law2 7-- he ought equally to be required to yield to more
diffusely-held interests in the affected river without compulsory com-
pensation.
The same observation may be applied to the wetlands cases.28 A
pristine example of the inextricability of property interests is marine
life that breeds along the shallow wetlands shorelines, depending
upon maintenance of the shoreline habitat. The wetlands owner thus
does not use only his own tract, but demands, as a condition of devel-
oping his property, that the ocean users tolerate a change in their use
of the ocean. Similarly, the ocean users demand that the wetlands
owner restrict his use. Most courts view the prohibition imposed upon
the wetlands owner as a taking of property by the public, necessitating
public purchase of those lands if they are to be preserved. The ques-
26. This problem has been recognized even in the context of conventional compensa-
tion law, where issues such as loss of view have been raised. Note, Eminent Domain
-Loss of View as an Element of Damages in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 19 AtA. L
REv. 202 (1966); Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Do-
main, 48 VA. L. REv. 437 (1962). See Defenders of Florissant v. Park Land Co., No. C-1539
(D. Colo. July 9, 1969y, rev'd, No. 340-69 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 1969). Suit was brought
to enjoin the private owner of land containing unique ancient fossil beds from bull-
dozing them as a prelude to residential development.
27. E.g., Mitchell v. Hines, 305 Mich. 296, 302, 9 N.W.2d 547, 550 (1943). See generally
%V. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 90.
28. The cases are cited at note 4 supra. In essence the laws prohibit those owning
low lying land along the shore of the ocean from filling and developing their lands
without obtaining governmental permission, and they allow "approval [to] be withheld
when . .. the proposal would... be damaging to the conservauon of public or private
water supplies or of wildlife or freshwater, estuarine or marine fisheries." M. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4702 (Supp. 1970). See also FLA. STAT. ANN., § 253.123(2)(d) (Supp.
1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 130, § 27A (Supp. 1970) and Old Lyme Zoning Regulations,
§ 3.17, Sept. 28, 1968 (held unconstitutional in Bartlett v. Zoning Commission, 161 Conn.
24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971)). Similar statutory provisions in other states include CO.4N. GE:%;.
STAT. ANN. § 22-7m (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 721, 727 (1970).
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tion raised here is why, if he wishes to impose a restriction on the use
of the oceans to promote his activities on his own land, the wetlands
owner ought not be compelled to buy that right?
The cases have not been viewed in this way, it appears, only because
the ocean is not owned as conventional private property, but is in
essence owned by the public at large. Though cumulatively the pub-
lic's interest may be very great, the interest of each member of the
public is typically small. By ignoring the cumulative right, each person
having an interest in the use of the ocean is treated not as a legitimate
interest-holder but as an interloper, and is forced to pay for the pro-
tection of his interest. This result is the consequence of our traditional
inability to recognize public rights, i.e., to see that claims of right to
use resources ought not to be discriminated against simply because
they are held in one, rather than another, conventional form of own-
ership.
Current takings law assumes that when the government restricts
the use of private property, the public has acquired something to
which it did not previously have a right. While scrupulously prevent-
ing total loss to the particular owner, it often imposes that loss upon
diffusely-held interests, such as those affected by drainage and erosion
from a mining operation or those dependent upon the marine re-
sources impaired by a wetlands filling and development project. The
constitutional takings provision, it is assumed, assures compensation
when government thus restrains the profit-making capacity of private
property owners in favor of a more general public claim. To the extent
that the courts adopt this perspective, they deny recognition of extant
public rights.
The prevailing view of compensation law has a considerable prac-
tical effect on resource allocation, since the prospect of having to pay
compensation is a constraint on government regulation of private
property. Though it may be desirable, in terms of maximizing the net
product of the aggregate resource base, to undertake a particular re-
striction on the use of private property, compelled compensation may
deter a legislature from enacting the restriction. Notice that under
current law, a failure to undertake restrictions may generate costs for
diffuse interest-holders for which no compensation must be paid.
Requiring compensation when a conflict among competing users is
resolved in favor of diffuse interest-holders, and not when it is resolved
against them, inevitably skews the political resolution of conflicts
over resource use and discriminates against public rights.
Furthermore, a system which compels compensation in the event
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of severe diminution in value ignores the possible incentive function
of leaving costs on private resource users. The question of allocating
costs of conflict among competing resource users will be discussed be-
low; for now it is sufficient to note that an important criterion in
resource allocation is minimizing the costs of future conflict, and this
goal is best served by a policy free to allocate costs on the party best
equipped to avoid such conflict. To bring under the takings clause
governmental restrictions designed to mediate between conflicting
interests is to introduce a doctrinal rigidity inconsistent with the kind
of planning essential to optimal resource allocation.
III. What Remains of Private Property?
An important observation to be made about the analysis set out
thus far is that it does not obliterate the distinction between mine
and thine that lies at the heart of a system of private property. Rather,
it notes that the simplistic way in which that distinction has been
made under existing property law, attending solely to the physical
boundaries of property, is insufficient. It does not make less valid a
demand for compensation when government restricts uses that do not
have spillover effects.
The purpose of the analysis stated above is not to permit a redis-
tribution of land to achieve the most socially beneficial use, but only
to put competing resource-users in a position of equality when each
of them seeks to make a use that involves some imposition (spillover)
on his neighbors, and those demands are in conflict. In such cases,
and such cases only, there is a conflict in which neither is a priori
entitled to prevail, because neither claimant has any more right to
impose on his neighbor than his neighbor does on him. Only in such
situations may one use be curtailed by the government without trig-
gering the takings clause.
It thus becomes necessary to explain what is meant by a use of
property that has a spillover or inextricable effect on other property.
The first and most obvious example of this situation is that in which
my use of my land results in a physical restriction of the uses that may
be made of other land, such as the mining of coal which results in
drainage on lower-lying land.
A second type of spillover effect is the use of a common to which
another landowner has an equal right, such as the dumping of water
from industrial use into a stream upon which a landowner downstream
depends for water supply. While a stream is the most obvious example
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of a common, it is by no means the only one. The ambient air is also
a common of sorts. Thus putting smoke or noise or light into the air
is the use of a common, and no use of land that has the effect of
burdening this common can be claimed as a constitutionally insulated
property right. Conversely, to use land in a way that demands silence,
darkness or the absence of smoke on one's land is similarly to burden
the common in air that belongs equally to one's neighbor and cannot
be a matter of constitutional right. The water overlying wetlands that
serves as a breeding ground for the adjacent ocean should also be
viewed as a common as to conflicting demands of ocean users and the
owner of the wetlands.
In a somewhat less conventional sense, a visual prospect is also a
common. Thus, if the landscape as a visual prospect is not confinable
to any single tract of land, no single landowner is entitled to dominate
it. The effects of a vast tower built on a single tract spill over visually
onto other lands just as smoke or noise does. Conversely, a majestic
mountain or a forest generates positive spillover effects on nearby
lands, and no owner has an unqualified constitutional right to destroy
the mountain.
There is yet a third, less physical, kind of spillover effect. It is a
use of property that affects the health or well-being of others, such
as the treatment of land with toxic substances that results in the
death of wildlife, or a use of property that imposes an affirmative
obligation on the community, such as residential development in a
remote area that would require the furnishing of police protection.
Any demand of a right to use property that has spillover effects in
any of the three senses described above may constitutionally be re-
strained, however severe the economic loss on the property owner,
without any compensation being required; for each of the competing
interests that would be adversely affected by such uses has, a priori,
an equal right to be free of such burdens.
Having thus defined spillover uses, it is essential to observe that
any uses of property that do not involve such spillover effects are
constitutionally entitled to protection, and may not be restricted
without the payment of compensation. Notably, this distinction pre-
vents a use of property from being restricted without compensation
simply because a neighboring demand would provide a greater net
benefit to the society.
The distinction may be illustrated by referring again to the strip
mining-lower residence example. A legislature could, without com-
pensation, prohibit mining resulting in drainage to protect the lower
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residences or it could prohibit residential uses that required freedom
from drainage, since each of these uses imposes a spillover demand
on the neighboring land. Assuming that mining were prohibited,
however, the legislature could not require the mine land to be used
as a parking lot for the cars of the lower residents, without compen-
sation, regardless of the need for additional parking space. For to
require the miner to submit to parking on his land without compensa-
tion would require him to forego profit from a use--such as farm-
ing, forestry or, indeed, operation of a private parking lot-that could
be carried out by him without imposing spillover demands on uses
the lower owners could make on their land. Assuming that uses can
be made of the upper land which do not physically restrict a neighbor,
burden a common, impose on the community an affirmative burden
of providing public services, or adversely affect some interest in health
or well-being (though of course they may adversely affect the useful-
ness of the lower land which badly needs additional parking space),
the landowner has a constitutional right to make those uses. If he is
restricted from doing so, he is entitled to receive as compensation the
value of the highest and best use that could be made without pro-
ducing spillover effects. If the legislature has restricted mining to
prevent erosion, the landowner is not entitled to any special value the
land may have as a coal mining site.
While the land described above would be physically invaded by a
parking lot, note that the right to compensation does not arise simply
because of that invasion. One's land may be invaded, as by a govern.
mentally tolerated influx of noise or smoke, without triggering the
takings clause, because both of the competing uses in question (e.g.,
residential as against industrial) put inconsistent demands on the
other, and both are a priori equal in status. Either use may be re-
stricted by the government without compensation.
Nor is a landowner better situated to receive compensation simply
because the surface of his land, rather than the common in air above
it, is invaded, for one may be required to tolerate a physical invasion
of the surface without being constitutionally entitled to compensation
(as where strip mining is permitted and water drainage over the lower
lying land occurs). Similarly, one could constitutionally be prohibited
from fencing his land, if that restriction were required to permit the
free passage of wildlife, which could be viewed as a common resource
not unlike a flowing river.
These examples are suggested only to emphasize that the traditional
indicia of property right violation do not determine the question of
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compensation under the theory proposed here. The only appropriate
question in determining whether or not compensation is due is whether
an owner is being prohibited from making a use of his land that has
no conflict-creating spillover effects. If the answer is affirmative, com-
pensation is due for the value of land for that use.
The case of an airport next to residential housing exemplifies at
least three variants of competing use problems that may help to clarify
the analysis.
(1) A landowner may be in conflict with the airport over the de-
sire to build a tall structure that interferes with flights to and from
the airport; (2) he may wish to maintain a residence that will be dis-
turbed by noise from the airport; (3) he may wish to farm his land
while the airport desires an extra runway on his tract.
The first situation involves conflicting claims to the use of a com-
mon, the ambient air, to which both air travellers and landowners
below a priori have an equal right of use. A resolution of that conflict
should be possible in favor of either party without compelling payment
of compensation to the losing party. The competing claimants here are
in a situation identical to that of conflicting claimants competing for
uses of the ocean. Whether a common exists ought to be a descriptive
question-that is, it ought to be decided by a determination of whether
a resource such as the ambient air is inextricably intertwined with the
use of various properties. On this basis, visual prospects and the water
overlying wetlands ought to be identified as commons. Nonetheless, it
must be recognized that the proper identification may be impeded to
some extent by historical definitions. For example, historically the
ambient air above land was defined as private property under the ad
coelum rule.29 Fortunately, in this instance the traditional definition
has already given way to changing historical facts (the invention of
the airplane), and the definition has been revised to recognize a com-
mon.30 In the same way, recently recognized ecological knowledge
should permit redefinition in other situations, such as that of the
wetlands.
The noise problem in the airport-residence example presents a dif-
ferent version of the spillover-inextricability situation. Here each of
the conflicting uses, residence and airport, demands the imposition of
29. "It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to
the periphery of the universe-Cuius est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (citations omitted).
30. "But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway,
as Congress has declared." Id. at 261.
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a form of servitude on the other. The airport requires the adjacent
land to serve as a receptacle for noise, and the resident requires the
airport to be held as a zone of quiet. Neither desired use can be
effectuated without burdening the other. Because of this conflict be-
tween the uses each owner desires to make upon his tract, the conflict
would be amenable to resolution in favor of either without the loser
being entitled to compensation, even though the loser's land may be
rendered worthless.
This brings us to the limiting case in which the airport wishes to
expand by placing a runway on its neighbor's land, and the neighbor
wishes to use that land for farming. Here the question is whether the
desire to use one's land for farming would necessarily infringe uses of
the airport land, or whether it involves conflict over the use of some
common. It seems clear that in the ordinary case it does neither. Farm-
ing on adjacent land may be perfectly compatible with any activity
carried on by the airport on its land, since ordinarily farming does
not require quietude, nor does it burden any common area. Neither
does it affect the health of others or impose any demand for public
services that is not generally being made available. In short, restricting
the farmer from farming goes beyond merely terminating a use with
spillover effects, and therefore the farmer should be constitutionally
entitled to farm, or to be paid for the losses incurred if farming is
prohibited.
Note that nothing in what has just been said suggests that farming
is, of itself, constitutionally protected. The famous case of Miller v.
Schoene,31 where neighboring landowners grew apple and cedar trees,
the cedar trees giving rise to a pest that destroyed the apple trees, is
a perfect example of an agricultural use that has spillover effects, and
was properly restrained without the payment of compensation. Thus,
in the example above, if farming resulted in erosion problems for
neighboring land, impairing the maintenance of the airfield, or if it
attracted birds that then congregated near the airfield and created an
impediment to flying (a version of use of the common), farming
could constitutionally be prohibited without compensation.
Why, one might ask, is the runway case, where I have said compen-
sation is due, different from the other examples given? Might it be
said that farming imposes a burden on the operation of the airport
31. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). For a discussion of this case from a perspective similar to
that proposed here, see Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes,
14 J. LAw & EcoN. 435 (1971).
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in that the airport cannot properly function without additional run.
ways? I think not. In the no-compensation examples, the use of one
owner's property within his domain in and of itself restricts desired
uses of another owner's property within that owner's domain-there
is a conflict grounded in inextricable demands. In the runway ex-
ample, the farmer's use within his domain adversely affects only the
airport's ability to undertake a particular use beyond its domain.
This is no trivial distinction. Nothing that has been said in this
article suggests that a property owner should be subject to restrictions
merely because another owner would benefit from use of the resources
within his neighbor's ownership, or because the society would be
advantaged by such a redistribution. The problem to which the pre-
vious analysis addressed itself was the case in which constitutional
protection of the right of one owner to make certain uses of his own
property was unfair, because such protection in and of itself denied
another the right to make uses of equal stature on his property or a
common-that is, a situation of inextricability.3 2 The purpose of the
analysis is thus to reorient constitutional law to a position of fairness
as between such equally-situated parties, each of whom makes similar
demands upon the other in the form of mutually exclusive spillover
uses of their domain. It is in this respect that the runway case signifi-
cantly differs from the noise or overflight cases cited above. From a
constitutional perspective, it is essential to recognize this distinction
32. Perhaps the one situation that cannot verbally be fitted into the test of a spill-
over use as one affecting another owner's uses "on" his land, is the demand for an
easement of access. In such a case the owner seeking access is not asserting a right of
use on his land, but rather the opportunity to reach his land. I would recognize a claim
to an easement of necessity, even against an owner other than the grantor of the land,
see 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 410 (1970), and grant it without requiring compensa.
tion, because it is necessary in order to put the claimant into a position to compete with
his neighbors to make uses of the same order as theirs, Such a demand is consistent with
the theory presented here that the law of takings should be revised in order to put
differing property owners into relative positions of equality. Access might be viewed as
a prior right that must be recognized in order to get one into a posture from which
he can compete. But see Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 259, 90 P. 532, 534
(1907).
As indicated below, such a right should only be recognized where the claim of access
must be made against a particular owner, rather than against any one of a number of
owners who could equally provide access through their land. P. 169 infra. This liml.
tation is necessary to maintain the equal protection element of taking law, preventing
discriminatory restriction of any one of a number of identically situated owners. Thus,
in the ordinary case, a landowner abutting the shore of the ocean could not be required
to provide access across his land, without receiving compensation, because there is no
reason to choose his land for an easement rather than the land of any one of a number
of similarly situated abutting landowners. However, access could, without compensation,
be required of one owner who holds all the abutting land, or of all shoreland owners.
It is interesting to note that in 1648 Massachusetts gave the right to the public to pass
over uncultivated private property in order to reach, and use, Great Ponds. Smith, The
Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern New England, S0 B.U.L. REv. 178, 183
(1950).
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as one designed to promote equality of treatment among competing
resource-users, and not as an attempt to wipe out the distinction be-
tween mine and thine that is the essence of a system of private property.
Having discussed these examples in the context of disputes between
"neighbors," it might be helpful to illustrate the application of the
theory in a case where the contending parties are a private property
owner and a more general public. Assume a situation in which there
is, on a long coastline, only a single bay suitable for naval purposes,
and the navy wishes to have the use of the bay for its ships. Assume,
furthermore, that the bay cannot be used for both naval and civilian
ships. May a law be constitutionally enacted providing, without com-
pensation, that the bay is closed to all civilian ships? It may, for the
bay, being a common, may be allocated to one, rather than another,
competing interest. Indeed, such a law would be similar to a require-
ment that a certain body of water be used for sport fishing only, ex-
cluding all commercial fishermen.
May the navy, having ships in the bay, store supplies on the shore-
land, held in private ownership, without payment of compensation?
It may not, for the storage of supplies, however necessary and desirable
it may be to enhance the usefulness of the bay to the navy, is not
itself a use of the common bay. The landowner who wishes to have
a residence or farm on his land adjacent to the bay is not making any
use of his land that impinges upon use of the common, the bay. Here
we must focus on the use the landowner wishes to make of his land,
and ask whether that use itself imposes a burden on those uses the
navy wishes to make of the bay. In the ordinary case, it does not.
Should the navy wish to use the bay as a gunnery range, rather
than a harbor, they could constitutionally do so, even though the
result would be to make the shoreland uninhabitable. Such a situ-
ation would be identical in theory to that of the resident near the
airport who is required to tolerate noise from airplanes.
Note that in the gunnery range example, farming on the shoreland
might be a spillover use because it might require a servitude upon an
a priori legitimate use of the common by the navy. To carry the analy-
sis a step farther, let us assume that the navy wishes both to make use
of the bay as a gunnery range and to store supplies on the shore-
land. In such a case, if it is determined that the gunnery use is pre-
ferred to the shore owner's uses, the shore owner must submit without
compensation. The next question is whether the landowner can make
use of the land in a manner consistent with the gunnery range
restriction.
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If the land could be farmed or used as a junkyard without imping-
ing on the gunnery range, the owner is entitled to make that use or
recover its value. Of course the fact that the navy could make use of
the land for storage suggests there will be some market for the
land as a storage site, and this would be the value to which the owner
is entitled.
Let us assume, once the gunnery program is established, that the
land has no use for agriculture or storage, even for the navy. Its only
value is as a scientific study site of the effects of bombardment. If there
is a market value to land used in this way, the landowner is entitled
to it, and is entitled to exclude 8 the navy from study on his land
33. Exclusive possession, as indicated earlier, is not the key to compensability. It Is
simply that in some cases, as with farming, protecting the owner's use is sufficient to
protect his right, since his use necessarily excludes all others. In other situations, as
where land is a scientific site and can simultaneously be studied by many others, tile
only way to protect the owner's property interest, as defined above, is to assert a right
to exclude others from entry for the protected purpose, e.g., for study.
This approach suggests a solution to the well known case of Vernon Park Realty, Inc.
v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954). The landowner wished
to develop his land, presently a parking lot, as a shopping center, for which It would
have great value. The land was then zoned for uses which limited it to continuation as
a parking lot. The zoning decision could presumably be justified as resolution of a
conflict between the interest in avoiding increased congestion and the interest of the
owner in developing his land. Development of the land would produce spillover in the
form of congestion elsewhere. Thus the owner is entitled to no compensation for the
reduction in value resulting from the zoning.
He could under this hypothesis, however, use the land for parking without producing
spillover effects on other land users. He is thus entitled to exclude anyone from inter-
fering with his use of the land for this purpose. Should the city want the land as a
public parking lot or storage site, they must pay the owner for the value it has for
non-spillover uses, in this case its value as a parking lot or as open space.
If a city zones the land to prohibit buildings and then occupies it as a public parking
lot, paying its value only as undeveloped land, but once in possession builds a public
office building on the site, the owner would be entitled to recover the land's full value
as an office building, for this sequence of events would demonstrate that the congestion
issue was fraudulent, and that use of the land for building was not inconsistent with
competing uses. To avoid such government disingenuity, one might permit the com-pensatio  proceeding to be reopened for a reasonable period, perhaps ive years, during
which the landowner could recover for the valu e h land for uses he could have
made consistent with competing claims, as indicated by the uses to which it is actual-
ly put.
A sufficiently long reopening period should deter almost all such manipulation. It
must be noted, however, that over the long run this is a problem faced even tinder con-
ventional compensation law, for government, when it condemns land now, pays compen.
sation predicated upon present zoning restrictions with an exception only for those
changes in zoning that are shown to be reasonably probable within the near future.
Long Beach H.S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal.2d 763, 185 P.2d 585 (1947); Annot., 9 A.L.R.Sd
291 (1966). It is always possible at some subsequent date that zoning will be changed
to permit more intensive use by the condemnor than was the case at the time the land
was taken.
A variant situation arises where government restricts certain activity to obtain the
owner's equipment for which there is no private market. In such a situation, compen.
sation would be due for the full value of the equipment, undiscounted by the fact of
the government being the only purchaser. Assuming the restraint itself were legitimate,
the owner could not recover for the lost opportunity to profit. See United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
Similarly, despite the navigation servitude tradition, where government denies a
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unless they pay that price. If there is no established market, an effort
will have to be made to find an analogy, as is often the case in con-
demnation law with respect to unique properties.
No doubt these distinctions will seem shocking to some readers,
and mechanical to others. But if one can put aside both the idea that
ownership of property necessarily implies a government guarantee
to profit from it when and as the owner in his sole discretion wishes,
and also the idea that the rights of property can be identified merely
by looking to effects within the boundary lines of a single owner, the
results suggested above may appear less troublesome. While it must
seem odd that one can constitutionally be required, in effect, to evacu-
ate his land in order to accommodate a neighbor's use, is it less odd
to think that a neighbor must maintain silence to accommodate an
adjoining landowner who maintains a residence, where silence destroys
most economically practical present uses for the land adjoining the
residence? Indeed, how can we say that constitutionally a bombing
range is necessarily a less legitimate use of land than a residence? If
the alternative is to require the navy to buy the adjacent land as a
noise sink, it is not less reasonable to demand that the resident pur-
chase a buffer area of quiet. This, however, brings us full circle, to
the implications of the inextricability analysis with which this article
began.3
4
Beyond the limits of the inextricability analysis, there remains one
additional category of situations in which compensation must continue
to be constitutionally required: the protection of property owners
against governmental discrimination. The rule against discrimination,
discussed in my previous article,35 operates to prevent the government,
when accommodation of conflicting interests could be achieved by
restraining any one of a number of similarly situated parties, from
selecting the owner upon whom the loss is to fall. This might be
deemed the equal protection dimension of compensation law.
Let us assume, for example, that the legislature decides there should
riparian owner the opportunity to develop his land as a power site and then builds a
public power facility on the land, recovery of the land's value as a powver site should
be permitted-though no compensation should be given if government simply decides
that the land cannot be developed as a power site. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S.
121 (1967); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); United
States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 US. 229, 236 (1960).
34. This would also constitute a return to the noxious use approach, dealt with in
an earlier article. Sax, supra note 2, at 48-50. Under this theory, the uses which can be
destroyed without compensation are those that are noxious, or wrongful, or harmful
in some sense.
35. Id. at 64-65.
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be a one-quarter acre vest pocket park on every ten acres of center-
city land. Assume further that there is no observable reason to impose
the open space obligations on any one, rather than another, owner
of indistinguishable quarter-acres within the area. Because it is a re-
quirement of the compulsory accommodation process that government
always be able to justify the Imposition of a burden on the particular
property owner, compensation in this case would be required. On the
other hand, where the government is regulating general classes of
property users such as strip miners and nearby landowners, or ocean
users and wetlands owners, or where the scope of regulation is de-
fensibly distinct, as in the identification of the strip mining problem
as a function of the slope of the lands, compensation is not required.80
The practical problem to be anticipated would arise when the
government refuses to pay compensation, claiming certain uses to be
distinguishable from other uses left unrestrained, while the affected
landowners demand compensation, arguing that their uses are in-
distinguishable from those of other similarly situated users07 The
problem is quite similar to that faced in the ordinary zoning process
where one who is left on one side of a limited commercial zone, rather
than the other, may find his property values considerably diminished.
At some point judicial rules must be devised to protect against ar-
bitrary and discriminatory line drawing, as in rules against spot zon-
ing.39 The scope of judicial intervention in this process is likely to
36. E.g., the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1970), which designates
eight rivers as "Wild and Scenic" rivers, and empowers the Departments of Agriculture
and Interior to prevent nearby development inconsistent with the designation. See
Asmussen & Bouchard, Wild and Scenic Rivers: Private Rights and Public Goods, In
CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMIENT 163 (R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-Smith eds. 1970). See
also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1243 et seq. (1970) which designates the initial units of a national trails
system protected from development. Similarly, if within a 'particular area, half tile
identical plots of land were to be developed and half maintained as open space, those
asked to refrain from development clearly ought to be paid. The degree of development
that has already taken place on the'land has usually been thought a rational basis for
distinction. E.g., Knight v. Grimes, 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964); Southwest En-
gineering Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
37. This was dramatically demonstrated in the debate over the creation of a Redwoods
National Park several years ago. While distinctions could be made as to the location,
age, and size of timber on the lands, there remained considerable disagreement as to the
size of the park. Within broad outlines, fairly clear distinctions could no doubt be made.
In the inevitable twilight zone, the potential of judicial inquiry can create useful pres-
sures to draw boundary lines with respect to observable natural boundaries, such as
topological features, water courses, transportation corridors and population features.
Wohlenberg, Economics, Aesthetics and the Saving of the Redwoods, in CONcREss AND
THE ENVIRONMIENT, supra note 36, at 83.
38. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926).
39. See, e.g., Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d
486 (1950); Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash.2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963). See generally I
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING §§ 5.04, 5.05 (1968).
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be modest, and the ambit of opportunity for dubious governmental
activity necessarily large. It is in this area, therefore, that the most
difficult cases in compensation law will be found.
Another problem raised by government action affecting property
rights, stressed in my former article, is the risk of excessive zeal.40
Simply stated, this is the problem of controlling the government's
economic self-interest in resolving problems with the smallest possible
outlay of tax funds. To the extent that government is vindicating ex-
tant public rights, as described above, its desire in general to avoid
compensation is not problematic. The essence of a public rights, or
public trust,41 approach to the question of takings, should make clear
that the government should vindicate the rights of taxpayers as a group
as well as the rights of individual property owners. The issue of exces-
sive zeal thus becomes the question of how well a balance is struck be-
tweeri diffusely-held claims and traditional property interests. While
the role of courts in scrutinizing that balance will be minor,42 the
judiciary may intervene at the extremes to hold a resolution of com-
peting claims to be so misguided as to be beyond the bounds of the
police power.
43
As a practical matter, the problem is less troublesome than might
at first appear. The "public interest," even if abstractly viewed as
somehow being superior to "private interests," will not routinely
prevail over traditional private rights. There will be political checks
on the decision-making process employed to resolve conflicting claims
on the common resource base. In many cases there will be substantial
numbers on both sides of an issue, demanding a principled determina-
tion from the decision-making body. An industrial interest which
stands to lose from a particular property restriction will doubtless
make its views known at least as clearly as those asserting diffuse
claims. Given that diffuse claims are likely to be the novel and for-
merly unrepresented ones, and that those with a concentrated interest
at stake can be expected to make their views known, it is not unreason-
able to leave conflict resolution to the legislature.
If the legislative decision-making process is rational, the question
will be resolved by a comparison of the relative benefits and detriments
A similar problem is raised in the context of political districting as a question of
gerrymandering. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
40. Sax, supra note 2, at 65.
41. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 16.
42. See note 53 infra.
43. Id.
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which arise from various possible solutions, without regard to the
identity of the parties or the manner in which the interests on either
side of the controversy are structured. The assumption that the leg-
islative decision-making process is rational in the sense of maximizing
net benefits is a substantial one, and will be discussed further below.
The question here, however, need not be whether the process is purely
rational, but only whether the compulsory payment or nonpayment
of compensation will make the process more rational. As was noted
earlier, the current takings scheme introduces an irrationality by re-
quiring compensation when the conflict resolution system imposes
extreme economic harm on discrete users but not when analogous
harm is placed on diffuse users.44 The proposed scheme has the ad-
vantage of making competing interests doctrinally equal, leaving their
accommodation to be decided as a matter of public policy rather than
of inflexible legal rules.
IV. Conflict Accommodation
Underlying the foregoing discussion of takings and public rights
is the idea that there exists some mechanism or set of mechanisms
for resolving conflicting claims of resource users, and that this process
of conflict accommodation is in some sense rational. Therefore, gov-
ernmental regulations of the sort which champion the rights of diffuse
interest-holders were said to represent not a "taking" of something
the "public" never before had, but rather a resolution of conflicting
claims of right.
The problem of how a legal system should resolve conflicting
claims is, of course, enormous, but it may help to lay out some guide-
lines which follow from the earlier discussion of the nature of property
and takings law. It is the main view of this article that the goal of a
system which regulates property rights should be the maximization
of the output of the entire resource base upon which competing
claims of right are dependent, rather than maintenance of the prof-
itability of individual parcels of property. As a rule of thumb, it may
be said that the proper decision as to competing property uses which
involve spillover effects is that which a rational single owner would
make if he were responsible for the entire network of resources af-
fected, and if the distribution of gains and losses among the parcels
of his total holding were a matter of indifference to him.
44. See p. 157 supra.
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To return to the example of strip mining, if one could earn $500
by building residences on the lower land while leaving the coal land
as a natural area, and only $100 by mining the coal on the higher land
while making the lower land useless, one would obviously forego
coal mining. The fact that the land is held in separate ownerships
ought to make no difference in determining appropriate use patterns,
when desired uses with spillover effects are in conflict. Obviously, very
few problems are this simple. Nor are the interests likely to be sus-
ceptible to any such exacting quantification. In the strip mining case,
for example, one would want to look not only at the market value of
the coal that could be produced, but also at the dependence of the
community upon the mine for jobs and other benefits. Similarly, com-
peting interests would include not only the immediate lower lands,
but also the interests of other more distant landowners and water
users. Not only are these values difficult to identify fully, but many
of them must be impressionistically evaluated. The potential hazards
to human health, adverse effects upon recreation, the value of ameni-
ties, and the effects of disruption and dislocation are not easily
quantified.
On first reflection, the prospect of government undertaking such
a net benefit analysis for all the property interests in conflict must
seem horrifying in its potential complexity and cumbersomeness. It
should be noted, however, that a good deal of such accommodation
is presently carried out both by legislatures, in the case of zoning
ordinances, and by courts, in the application of nuisance laws.
There are basically three ways in which conflicts among competing
users of a common resource network can be resolved: (1) by private
negotiation among the competitors themselves, in which money trans-
fers are used to balance the losses and benefits to the satisfaction of
the parties; (2) by legislative or administrative decision, as in the
case of zoning laws which are subject to judicial review; and (3) by
courts in cases of direct legal conflict.
A. Private Negotiation
The private negotiation model has influential supporters45 and is
very attractive in that it leaves to the parties, rather than any gov-
ernmental entity, the extraordinarily difficult -task of evaluating the
numerous, complex and frequently unquantifiable values at stake in
any conflict situation. Thus, where a coal mining operation is pro-
45. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 9.
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ducing only $100 of value and is destroying $500 of value in lower
residential opportunities, the lower owners should perceive their in-
terest in buying the right to close the coal mine, assuming that
transaction costs are minimal. Moreover, insofar as the maximization
of total net benefits is a principal goal of the property system, and
neither party is viewed as having a constitutional right to use his
property exactly when and as he wishes, it is constitutionally a matter
of indifference whether the coal mines are closed by a transfer pay-
ment from the lower owners to the mine owner, or whether the mine
owner bears the loss from a regulation closing his mine.
40
While nothing in this article is antithetical to the use of private
negotiation to effect the benefit analysis process, where very diverse
interest groups are involved the substantiality of transaction costs in
organizing a fully informed market suggests the inadequacy of re-
liance solely upon private negotiations.47 It is therefore frequently
necessary to invoke the authority of government.
While an agreement whereby lower landowners permit their land to
be adversely affected by mining activity for a valuable consideration
ought to be respected as between those parties,48 such an agreement
could not restrict the government's exercise of the police power since
in any such accommodation the interests being considered would
doubtless go beyond the contracting parties.40
46. While the placement of the costs of accommodation is a matter of indifference
constitutionally, under the approach of this article it is not of indifference as a matter
of policy. The problem with privately negotiated accommodations is that the party
holding a dominant physical position would always be able to exact a payment from
the other party to the controversy. As we shall see, mere physical position ought not
to determine the cost allocation questions. See p. 177 infra. Compare Michelman, supra
note 2, at 1180-81.
47. M. OLSON, JR., THE Locxc OF CoLLECrIVE ACrION: PUBLIC GOODS AND *t&U: TiiEORY
OF GROUPS (1965); Michelman, supra note 2, at 1174-76; Calabresi, Transaction Costs,
Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67 (1968).
48. See Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
49. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
The proposed treatment of private contracts should also guide those situations in which
government, as an owner, has sold a right of use in its property such as in the leasing of
federal oil lands. No compensation would be constitutionally required for the loss of
right to profit from oil drilling if the government later prohibited drilling. Inasmuch as
the lease price is likely to have included the anticipation of permission to drill, one
might ask which of two contracting parties should be viewed as having borne the risk
of changes in the law.
In that sense the question is the same as that involved when one sells a stock of beer
on the day before Prohibition is declared, with delivery to be made a week later. Cf.
Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).
Since the government is both a contracting party and the maker of legal rules, the
risk of government mendacity should be minimized by inclusion of a reopening period.
See note 33 supra. It might, for example, be held that if restrictions are imposed within
a certain time following the sale, the buyer is entitled to recover back from government
the entire price paid.
Government could thus restrain the strip miner and allocate the costs of accommoda.
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B. Legislative and Administrative Decisionmaking
It seems clear that neither legislatures nor administrative agencies
operate as perfect cost-benefit analysts. Yet, while an exacting quanti-
fication of benefits and costs may not be possible, the very act of
considering the claims of conflicting resource users, identifying the
interests at issue, and searching for solutions, should push the process
toward rationality if representation before the legislature is adequate.
An example of this conflict accommodation process can be seen in
the current controversy over highways and transportation, where in-
terests other than the mere facilitation of traffic have emerged in the
legal process,50 such as interests in the maintenance of parks and the
housing problems of relocated persons, and the true cost of facilitation
of motor vehicle traffic. This has provoked a search for information
about a wide range of methods of accommodating conflict, including
new techniques of route selection, tunneling under parks and other
natural areas, restricting highway use, and alternative forms of trans-
portation. In this respect, the process of net benefits analysis in the
highway area can be seen as a process of continuing legislative enlight-
enment about costs and benefits, evidenced by a continuing series of
intermediate choices toward the optimal utilization of the resource
networks affected by transportation.
Clearly, this is an ongoing process, as no single legislative act can
resolve these complex questions. Each act is instead a tentative and
intermediate choice that is itself a part of a network of continuously
growing data and continuously growing alternative choices for leg-
islative action.
tion to him, even though he has already made a payment to the lower owner. Whether,
in such a case, the miner should be entitled to recover back what he has paid the
lower owner can be settled by an interpretation of the contractual arrangements made
between the parties.
From a theoretical point of view, if the accommodation favoring the lower owners is
a correct one, the payment that would have to be made to compensate the losses in-
curred by continued mining would exceed the benefits accruing from continued mining.
for the essence of the accommodation in favor of restraining strip mining is that the
benefits from the mining are less than the losses which it causes to the other affected
uses. If the strip miner, then, truly had to calculate and pay the full costs of continuing
his activity, he would voluntarily have ceased mining, for that would have been the
cheaper course of action.
In practice this suggests that if mining continues, any payment actually made will
have been insufficient, in part because of the "free ride" problem which induces bene-
ficiaries of an indivisible good or service to withhold payment, in part perhaps as a
result of lack of knowledge or effective bargaining power or difficult) in organizing a
private market that could cope with the entire affected resource network. This is simply
another way of saying what has been commonly noted-that many activities are carred
on without taking account of their true social cost.
50. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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C. The Judicial Role
Even under the revised doctrine of takings proposed here, there
will be a need for constitutional decisionmaking by courts to deter-
mine whether a governmentally imposed constraint discriminates
among equally situated property owners51 or prevents property own-
ers from making profitable uses that do not have spillover effects.62
It is always possible for a property owner to claim that a legislative
benefit analysis is wrong, but because such decisions inevitably involve
substantial elements of legislative judgment and value preference,
this hardly seems an appropriate area for constitutional decisionmak-
ing. It would involve courts in a re-examination of legislative social
welfare choices. Judicial intervention of this kind, therefore, ought
to be limited to those cases in which the court is satisfied that the
legislative determination is sufficiently distorted as to constitute an
abuse of the police power; that the legislature has subordinated :t
judgment about maximization of social benefits to advancement of
private gain.5
3
Courts should, however, continue to intervene in net benefit analy-
sis decisions at the non-constitutional level, to assure, for example,
that determinations made by administrative agencies are consistent
with legislative policy and are based on sufficient information, or to
invoke the legislative remand technique."4
51. See p. 169 supra.
52. See section III supra. Though the discussion here is limited to the judicial role
with respect to claims that there has been a taking, nothing in this article is meant to
alter the availability of nuisance and trespass actions where the government has not
acted on a particular problem of conflicting uses.
53. The famous Illinois Central case, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892),
discussed at length in a previous article, Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note
16, at 489-91, and in J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, ch. 7 (1971), is illustrative of
the proposed use of judicial power as a constitutional matter in that it seeks to articulate
the point at which a purported exercise of the police power constitutes such mismanage.
ment of resources as to be an abuse of legislative authority. For an example of a court
seekini not very successfully to identify the limits of its function in examining a legis.
lative judgment, see National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd., 419 Pa. 504, 514.33,
215 A.2d 597, 603-13 (1966).
Courts may probe significantly into the propriety of condemnation decisions made by
administrative agencies or private entities having eminent domain authority, without
having to reach a constitutional confrontation with the legislature. See Micntire, "Ne.
cessity" in Condemnation Cases-Who Speaks for the People?, 22 HAST. L.J. 561 (1971);
Costello, Challenging The Right to Condemn, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 52; Note, Challenging
the Condemnor's Right to Condemn: Avoidance of Peripheral Damages, 1967 WASH.
U. L.Q. 436; Note, Necessity in Eminent Domain Proceedings: Four Cases, 29 MONT.
L. REV. 69 (1967).
54. The legislative remand technique is "[t]he device by which courts . . . halt a
project found to infringe public rights [and] in so doing . . . thrust upon the promoter
of that project the affirmative obligation to go back to the legislature and obtain specific
authorization (if he can get it) that makes clear a decisive public policy." J. SAX, DL-
FENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 53, at 175. Thus it is "[a] judicial technique to
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V. Allocating the Costs of Accommodation
It is not enough to argue that the costs of accommodating con-
flicting claims on the common resource network need not be borne
by the public as a matter of constitutional law. It remains to determine
who is to pay those costs.e5 Narrowing the reach of the takings clause
thus places the matter of cost allocation in the realm of policy choice,
where it properly belongs.
In establishing legislative-administrative guidelines for distributing
the costs of conflict accommodation, there are several models from
which to choose. Under the existing compensation law, costs are borne
by the regulated party unless doing so would destroy the value of his
property altogether, in which case they are borne by the public. Al-
ternatively, existing compensation law sometimes imposes costs upon
a party's activities if they are found to be a noxious use, a nuisance,
or the cause of the harm.56
A second cost allocation model to which legislatures might turn is
enterprise liability,57 which seeks both to spread costs widely and to
impose them on the beneficiaries of the activity. The effort to identify
beneficiaries, however, ultimately brings one back to the old "cause of
the harm'" problem that has plagued takings law.5s Is the damage from
strip mining caused by the desire to mine coal, or the desire to maintain
residences in the area of the mines? The inextricability analysis set
out above makes clear the folly of trying to answer that question.
While a general theory of cost spreading has the desirable effect of
assuring that economic loss does not fall too harshly on any individual,
the broadest spreading can obviously be accomplished by making
the general public bear the cost. But this simply returns us to the prob-
thrust a problem of significance upon a busy legislature's attention. ... It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that the governmental process is a process-diffuse, interlocking.
interdependent-and that any discussion of what courts can do, or what legislatures
should do, must never lose sight of the fact that it is how we are governed that is in
issue, not some academic theory about the purity of institutions." Id. at 188.89.
55. The costs of conflicts among competitors for the use of certain resources arc what
Professor Calabresi calls primary costs. G. CAL&UBI.si, THE CosT oF AcctrLrs: A LE.CAL
AND EcoNOsIc ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter cited as THE CosT OF ACCIDENTs].
56. I have discussed the inadequacies of both these approaches in a previous article.
Sax, supra note 2, at 48-60.
57. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Goldberg v. Kolsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81 (1963); REsTATMENTFr (SEcoND) OF Toaxs § 402 A; Michelman, supra note 2. See Spies
& McCord, supra note 26, at 452, for a discussion of risk distribution principles of tort
law applied to compensation problems.
It has been suggested, however, that such a model in practice would cause horrendous
administrative problems. See Michelman, supra note 2. at 1178.79.
58. Sax, supra note 2, at 48.
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lem of public rights. Must the public, in essence, buy the right to regu-
late by compensating all losses incurred as a result of government
regulation?
A third way of approaching the cost allocation problem would be
principally designed to prod innovation. If the costs of accommodation
at any given time are borne by the general public, the absence of
economic pressure on those immediately involved may produce a
less than optimal solution in the long run, since the optimal solution
to any given conflict is rarely, if ever, fully known at any given time.
More importantly, optimal solutions are by no means static. One
need only consider an issue such as air pollution from automobiles
to get a sense of the magnitude and complexity of the problem. Al-
ternative solutions include mechanical modification of existing auto-
mobiles, the development of new types of engines, or a shift to alter-
nate forms of transportation.
In such situations, the very ability to find an optimal solution can
be affected by a rule that produces pressures for innovation. The
present system of compensation, permitting one to treat the current
ability to profit as a property right, provides incentives to innovate
only technologies that are immediately profit-producing for present
owners. Coal, for example, may sit in the ground for years because it
cannot be extracted profitably. As soon as one develops a machine to
exploit it more cheaply, he is assumed to have a constitutional right
to extract it profitably, notwithstanding the damage his technique
may impose on others."9
It is this behavioral aspect of cost allocation theory that is at issue
here. What structure of incentives does a legal system create when
it treats existing technology as property, without examining the effects
of that technology on others?60
59. Of course private law actions may be available to those who arc damaged, but
as far as government restrictions are concerned, in most cases the owner is viewed as
having a constitutional right to be protected against total loss of profits, though regit.
lation is usually permitted to be imposed so as to reduce his profits substantially. See
note 7 supra. In limited situations, the public interest has been viewed as prevailing
over profit-making, thus codifying a hierarchy of public welfare considerations. Id. A
drug company that has invested its entire capital in the development of a new remedy
and come up with Thalidomide is, even now, not in a position to complain if govern.
ment sends it back to the laboratory via a bankruptcy proceeding.
60. This problem is well known in nuisance law, with its traditional acceptance of
the state of the art of defense. It has also plagued administrative agencies which see
their function as imposing obligations only up to the point of presently known and
available technology. This issue has begun to be explored in the literature. Se' Katz,
The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (1909);
Tribe, Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and Control of Technology, IX MINERVA
243 (1971); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, TECINOLOGY PROCESSEs or AssEssMENT AND
CHoICE (U.S. Govt. Print. Office, July 1969).
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It is well understood in some contexts that government power may
be used to drive marginal producers out of business, as in the case of
factories that cannot or will not employ existing technology, or which
cannot provide minimally required wages and safety devices. The
problem of the marginal producer is not limited, however, to the
ability to meet present technology. It is possible that an industry ought
not to be in the hands of owners who are unable to carry forward an
acceptable level of research and development. Those who now own
coal suitable for strip mining may be quite thinly capitalized and
requiring them to accommodate the demands of nearby lands for
water pollution and erosion control may drive them out of business
under present technology and market conditions. Were those lands
owned by larger corporate enterprises with a substantial research
capacity however, a sensible economic view would make clear that
present restrictions only impair present usefulness, and need not ren-
der the land permanently useless. Over time, it can be expected that
technology will be developed allowing profitable extraction of minerals
without undue harm to other users of the common resource network.
Taking a larger view of governmental regulation, it may be desirable
to produce just this result, and to get the mineral rights into the hands
of those who can afford needed research.("
Owners who have no other substantial property may have to sell out,
their investment simply not having matured in the way, or at the time,
that they would have liked. Those who are truly devastated economi-
cally by such a result should be able to turn to government agencies
which deal with the victims of natural disaster, economic depression
and other such need-creating events.
0 2
61. If this were to occur, the law would in one sense repeat the history of those
lands. Having been sold once for lumber and having become relativel) worthless (be-
cause there was no market nor an extractive technology for getting the coal out profit-
ably), the land often passed into the hands of those who were able and willing to wait
for a time when technology developed; the law may say they must wait still longer. If
they can afford to wait, they will do so. If not, they will pass the land on (for even
under those conditions it is not likely to be wholly worthless) to those who can afford
research and waiting.
62. Here the legislature is involved in what Calabresi would call secondary cost
avoidance, i.e., reducing the costs of adjustment to dislocations which result when sub.
stantial losses are placed on a particular party rather than being spread more broadly.
THE Cosr OF AccIDrrs, supra note 55, at 39-67. Policies such as relocation and retraining
assistance, or perhaps lump-sum transfers not inconsistent with cost allocation for in-
centive purposes, may well be recommended to thus mitigate the dislocative effect of
government policies.
The final cost in the Calabresi trilogy is tertiary cost, consisting of the administrative
or transaction costs of operating the mechanism by which primary and secondary costs
are controlled. The goal of the cost allocation system may be thought of as the mini-
mization of the sum of all costs through time. Michelman, Book Revicw, 80 YMX L.J.
647, 651 (1971).
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While this approach may result in undue concentration of economic
power as certain lands become useful only to those who can afford
either to hold the lands or to engage in substantial research, this
problem should be treated on its own merits, and not submerged in
an undiscriminating interpretation of compensation law.03 Should a
legislature feel that rigorous environmental protections will drive too
much land into the hands of large companies, it can itself decide to
subsidize research or interim control programs for small producers.
The point is that this is a matter of legislative policy and not of con-
stitutional requirement.
The same may be said of a fear that rigorous environmental con-
trols on the extraction of coal, for example, will create an energy
crisis. Properly implemented, laws governing the production of coal
will weigh the social value of the coal produced against the costs
incurred by unrestricted production. As the need for the coal increases,
the position of coal producers will improve relative to other conflict-
ing property owners. At some point it may be determined that the
losses incurred by mining coal under present technology are in the
public interest. Government may then be forced to maintain pressure
for the development of new protective technology by directly financing
research in the public sector, or by imposing a more limited cost allo-
cation than that involved in a complete prohibition of coal mining.
The point is that these issues should be resolved on their own merits,
as questions of benefit optimization policy, rather than as elements
of the constitutional law of property rights.
If the property owner has any claim upon our solicitude, it must
proceed from the claim that a sharp modification in the legal rules
would unfairly violate his expectations. When the question is asked
whether one is legally entitled to the expectation that the law will
not significantly change, it must be recognized that the law has often
changed in ways that have been sharply disadvantageous to property
owners.64 The more useful question, raised by the premise of present
63. I do not mean to minimize the importance of the problem of concentration,
especially in light of the concern expressed over coal firms being purchased by large
oil companies. I do suggest that the problem is more complex than merely one of eco-
nomic concentration.
64. See Sax, supra note 2, at 51-52. It is not uncommon for a court quite suddenly to
discover, or rediscover, a doctrine that significantly reduces the value of property rights,
E.g., Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970). For a discussion of
Bentham's view of expectations, see Michelman, supra note 2, at 1212.
Furthermore, the question of expectations must be evaluated in light of the nature
of the governmental regulation. When the government has vindicated public rights and
in so doing has caused an individual economic injury, the government action follows
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compensation law, is whether it is necessary for every property owner
to have the opportunity to profit from the use of his land as he wishes,
and at every given moment of time. Plainly, owners of property are
frequently able to forego present profits and tolerate a considerable
degree of economic uncertainty while awaiting changes in market
conditions, technology, population movement, public investment and
changes in the law that would remove present impediments to profit.
To be sure, knowledge of acceptable levels of uncertainty is highly
important to management of the economy since at some point of un-
certainty prices will plummet and the economic structure as a whole
may be severely threatened. From the perspective of the present in-
quiry, however, it need only be noted that in simply asserting that
every property owner must be protected in the present opportunity
to profit from his property, existing compensation law provides a
quite undiscriminating response to the uncertainty problem.0 5
Having elaborated a framework for thinking about cost allocation,
it remains to outline the circumstances under which government
should impose the costs of accommodation upon one private party,
rather than another, or upon the public treasury.
The issue can be illustrated by reference to the problem of auto-
mobile air pollution. Initially, one must make a decision about ac-
commodating the conflict between those who must breathe the fumes
and those who are responsible for their production. Let us assume
that while the total cost of the pollution amounts to $1 million in
losses to members of the public, the imperfection could be cured by
investing an additional $2 million in manufacturing. It would be a
proper accommodation to withhold the investment and permit cars
at present to operate with the defects. It then must be asked, however,
whether the million dollar loss should be allocated to the injured class,
or to the manufacturers. In reaching this decision, it is of no conse-
from a situation in which the property owner has been imposing costs on others without
compensation. The argument for holding these government regulations to be exercises
of the police power rather than takings is that the disadvantaged owner is yielding
something which objectively was not his to begin with. Much as in a recovery action in
tort, expectations of this kind need not be recognized as "reasonable" and given legal
protection.
65. Nor does the present rule serve as an intelligible guide for the individual property
owner for protection against economic disaster. It operates equally for the rich and the
poor, protecting each only against those reductions in value that approach 100 per cent.
Thus, the poor man who loses two-thirds the value of his home, his only asset, receives
no compensation; while the rich man who loses all of one of his hundred tracts is fully
compensated. If this is rough justice, it is rough indeed. For other oddities of the present
rule, see Sax, supra note 2, at 51-54. 60. But see Waite, Governmental Power and Private
Propery, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 283. 289 (1967), suggesting that the "circumstances of the
landowner" be taken into account.
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que.nce that one use rather than another was found to be benefit
optimizing. Nothing in this analysis purports to give weight to a
characterization of the problem as being "caused" by one, rather than
another, of two activities in conflict. The analysis instead seeks to
identify the class best equipped to organize for the purpose of dis-
covering less costly solutions to the problem. 0
In general, the prospects for useful innovation seem inversely re-
lated to the diffuseness of the entity upon which the burden is placed,
the smallness of the interest of each member of the entity in the
conflict, and the irregularity or uncertainty of the problem for that
entity.67 Basically, this is because groups bearing these characteristics
are ill-suited to carrying on concerted activity, given the diffuseness
of interests and the high transaction costs involved in organization.
Thus in the auto pollution case, the injured class is highly unorganized
and the risk of damage seems remote and unpredictable to any indi-
vidual member of the class. Automobile manufacturers, however, com-
prise a highly organized constituency for whom the problem is of
considerable magnitude as to each constituent member of the group.
When charged with these costs, a significant incentive is created to
produce a technology that will reduce or terminate the problem, pro-
vided a solution can be generated at a cost less than the cumulative
costs incurred by those injured by pollution.
Thus the goal of the system ought to be to identify that constitu-
ency which, if charged with the costs of accommodating the conflict,
would have a large stake in a lower cost solution, and which is capable
of organizing to cope with the problem.
At times no existing party to the conflict may be suitable for the
imposition of innovation-prodding costs. For example, the class of
persons injured in apartment house fires is clearly a diffuse group,
not easily organized, and its relation to the problem of fires is not
easily perceived. Similarly, fire is sufficiently rare and unpredictable
that the owners of buildings would not be likely to serve as a force
66. For an exploration of this general question, see M. OLsoN, JR., supra note 47.
Calabresi terms this the search for the cheapest cost avoider. THE CoST OF ACCIDENTS,
supra note 55, at 135-73; Michelman, supra note 2, at 1167 el seq.
67. It is recognized that the burden will generally be passed on by manufacturers to
consumers in the price of cars, and that users of cars as a class largely overlap the
class of air pollution victims. But from the perspective of imposing innovative pressures,
it makes a good deal of difference whether the costs are reflected in the general price
of cars or are distributed as medical expenses, even among the same group of people.
Only in the former case is the manufacturer-seeking to keep the price of his product
down-likely to feel concerted pressure for innovation. The same may be said of re-
straints imposed on coal mining, factories, airports or any other activity.
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for the innovation of fire protection technology. It has been our ex-
perience that only the organization of a group with a concerted and
continuous interest in fire protection serves as an innovative force in
such situations, e.g., the fire insurance industry.
Insofar as cost allocation in the context of this article is concerned,
it seems proper for a choice to be made as between the conflicting
parties only when there is a significant probability that the imposition
of costs would be innovation-prodding. Where some private entity
can be developed that will have a concerted interest in the problem,
the legal rules for cost allocation should encourage such development.
In the area of strip mining, for example, where persons involved in
land reclamation are required to be insured with a bond for security
against failure to meet the legal standards involved, insurance com-
panies writing these bonds have moved in to develop knowledge and
expertise about land reclamation.
68
Similarly, where governmentally imposed accommodations are so
rigorous as to drive out the present class of owners, the effect is to
give rise to a new institution, or pattern of ownership, that has the
capacity and concerted interest in the problem sufficient to cope with
it. While it may not be that cost allocation induces an old class of
owners to innovate,69 ownership may be transferred to a constituency
that is capable of holding the property while seeking to develop an
68. See Stevens, Sti Mine Reclamation Good in Spots, Inferior in Others, Courier-
Journal (Louisville, Kentucky), September 1, 1969. at 1, col. 1. Both Kentucky and West
Virginia now require a bond of applicants for strip mining permits, which bonds are
forfeited if the operator violates the regulations regarding methods of operation or
reclamation. See KY. REv. STAT. §§ 350.060(7), 350.130(1-2) (Supp. 1970); WNssr VA. CODE
§ 20-6-16 (Supp. 1971).
69. One must be careful that the accommodation and cost allocation processes do
not work at cross purposes. Conceivably, in a situation like the strip mine example, it
would be determined that mining should be permitted to continue-when all the benefits
of the mining, beyond those directly to the mine owner, are considered. It might also
be determined that costs of accommodation should be allocated to mining. In theory,
the costs of accommodation are always less than the benefits from mining, so that allo-
cating those costs to the mine could not put it out of business. But the benefits accrue not
only to the mine itself. Thus the total benefits from mining may be $1,000, and the
costs of continued mining to lower owners only $500. Mining should continue, but the
whole $1,000 of benefits may not accrue to the miner. He individually may only reap
$300 of benefits. To impose the entire $500 accommodation cost on him would be to
close the mine, an undesired result in the circumstances. The ideal solution is to spread
the $500 cost among other beneficiaries of continued mining, where that is practicable.
Where it is not, the practical solution may be to reduce the amount of costs allocated
to the miner to a point where he can continue in business. This will still impose some
innovative pressure on him.
Of course, this situation arises only where the miner prevails in the accommodation.
Should the lower users prevail, and it is determined to allocate costs to the miner, one
need not worry about his going out of business. In such a situation, the cost allocation
is designed to prod him, or someone who purchases the property from him, to seek out
new ways of using the property that will be consistent with the protection of lower
users. That is the situation referred to in the text.
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acceptable and profitable solution to the conflict. Such an occurrence
may be viewed as a variant of the development of the insurance in-
dustry in the example given earlier.
It may well be that in some situations there is no reasonable prospect
that any of the immediate parties to the conflict is likely to produce
innovative solutions and further, that no new institutional or owner-
ship force is likely to develop. In such circumstances, the costs of
accommodation should be borne by the general public, through insti-
tutions designed specifically for the purpose of absorbing these costs.
This will be necessary in cases where the capital costs of research are
so great, or the potential for solutions so extremely remote, that no
institution in the private sector of the economy is capable of taking
up the challenge. 0
Sometimes, a decision as to cost allocation will require a choice
between two industries, rather than between a highly organized in-
dustry and a constituency of widely dispersed private citizens. Con-
sider, for example, the problem of airplane noise in residential areas.
Is the problem of innovation to be viewed as one for the air travel
industry or for the residential housing industry?
In answering this question, attention should be paid to the per-
vasiveness of this problem for each of the industrial groups that are
potential sources of innovation. If, for example, it were noted that
ninety per cent of all airports were close to residential areas, but only
one per cent of residences were near airports, it would be desirable to
impose the costs on the airport or on the airline industry. In such
a situation, the cost of airport noise, if imposed on the residents,
would not likely be reflected in the cost of housing generally, whereas,
if imposed on the airlines or airports, the costs would be reflected in
the general costs of operating those industries.
Another factor in determining cost allocation illustrated by the
airport-residence noise problem involves a judgment about the kinds
of optimizing solutions likely to be fruitful within the foreseeable
future. If a policy is to be directed to the promotion of research, it
is necessary to ascertain the kind of research that ought to be encour-
aged, i.e., whether the greatest potential lies in the technology of
70. Underlying this allocative principle is the notion of secondary cost minimization.
Rather than perhaps inaccurately assigning costs in situations where it is Impossible to
identify the cheapesi cost avoider, public policy might limit its concern in Instances of
this type to secondary cost minimization, or spreading. See note 62 supra.
184
Vol. 81: 149, 1971
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights
building airplanes, the modification of airport operations, or the im-
provement of residences to make them less susceptible to neighboring
noise. It would be most appropriate to induce innovation by that
industry in which the greatest probability of fruitful research lies.
Thus the cost allocation problem is a complex one, and all factors
will not always tend in a single direction. At times one may have to
choose between a concerted and well-organized group with a relatively
small stake in the problem, and a rather diffuse group with quite a
large stake. In the case of automobile air pollution, the possible op-
timizing solutions, as noted previously, are very diverse. Aside from
improving the automobile, one might wish to move to a much en-
larged system of public transportation to reduce the total quantum
of travel, or to alter residential patterns so that people might cease
to live so near highways. Alternatively, automobiles might be restricted
from densely populated areas.
Notably, each of these solutions would require a very different
approach. If we wish to promote change in the automobile, it makes
good sense to impose the cost of air pollution on automobile manu-
facturers. If one felt that the greatest promise lay in discouraging
driving, an appropriate step might be to raise the price of gasoline by
a significant amount, thus imposing the costs on the general driving
public in hopes of changing behavior patterns. If one wished to move
to an enlarged system of public transportation, however, the resources
required to provide an alternative model of transportation might well
be beyond the automobile industry for all its wealth. The problems of
land acquisition, regulation of land development patterns and the
related questions in developing mass transit systems may require power
and resources available only to the general government.
The present resolution of this conflict demonstrates the applica-
bility of the general principles set out in this article. If we are satisfied
that it is sensible to impose emission limits on the automobile, as we
have done, it is because we believe that accommodation in favor of
a lower level of auto emissions will enlarge net social benefits beyond
the existing unregulated situation. On those grounds, the conflict is
resolved in favor of reduced automobile emissions.
One can accept each of these propositions without asking whether
the auto pollution problem is caused by the automobile industry or
by the consumer demand for automobile travel, without asking wheth-
er the opportunity to manufacture cars is, or is not, a property right.
185
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The automobile need not be characterized as a nuisance, nor need
one try to divine whether travel is more of a right than clean air. If
one truly believed that the auto air pollution problem were a problem
of rights and wrongs, property and non-property, nuisance and noxious
use, it would be impossible rationally to accommodate conflict and
allocate the costs of that accommodation.
In short, rather than fumbling with doctrinal labels and legal ac-
cusations, we can put our energy into trying to determine what reso-
lution of conflicting uses is likely to maximize total net benefits for
us, and how we can best achieve that goal.
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